Cargo Anti-Theft Protection Systems, Apparatus, and Methods

ABSTRACT

Cargo anti-theft systems, apparatus, and related methods. Anti-theft controllers of embodiments are configured to sense the openings of cargo switches and to electronically operate locks responsive thereto. Moreover, the switches are mechanically coupled to the access points in manners such that the access points cannot be opened without opening the switches. Some controllers are configured to output signals indicative of openings of the switches while some are configured to unlock the locks only in pre-selected geo-zones. The pre-selected voltages, moreover, can differ from 12 VDC and can be user-selected. Furthermore, controllers can be configured to sense (modifiable) PINs associated with openings of the cargo switches. The controllers can include a coupler which securely couples it to the vehicle. It can also be configured to sense a position of the lock. Such controllers, furthermore, can be configured to lock the lock responsive to the lock position and/or can comprise a battery.

CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application claims priority to Patent Cooperation Treaty patentapplication No. PCT/US14/54796, titled FUEL ANTI-THEFT SYSTEMS,APPARATUS, AND METHODS, filed by Elom Tsogbe on Sep. 9, 2014 whichclaims priority to U.S. provisional patent application No. 61/883,431titled FUEL ANTI-THEFT SYSTEMS, APPARATUS, AND METHODS, filed by ElomTsogbe on Sep. 27, 2013, the entirety of both of which is incorporatedherein as if set forth in full. This application also claims priority toand is a non-provisional application of U.S. provisional patentapplication No. 61/980,470 titled CARGO PROTECTION SYSTEMS, APPARATUS,AND METHODS, filed by Elom Tsogbe on Apr. 16, 2015 the entirety of whichis incorporated herein as if set forth in full.

BACKGROUND

Theft of gasoline, diesel fuel, and/or other vehicular fuels representsa substantial loss to cargo carriers in many parts of the world.Notably, in many developing countries, fuel represents an easily soldcommodity that cannot be traced and which garners a high return in theblack market. Thus, parked vehicles stand as undefended targets for fuelthieves. Even attended vehicles, though, can be at risk particularly ifthe driver is “on the make.”

Of course, the fuel contained in these vehicles can be accessed via thefuel fill cap (or simply “fuel cap”). A thief can remove the fuel cap,route a tube or hose through the adjoining fill tube, and siphon fuelfrom the tank. Moreover, vehicular fuel systems typically present anumber of less conventional “entry points” through which a thief canaccess the fuel contained therein. More specifically, typical vehicularfuel systems include a fuel tank (sometimes with a drainfixture/feature), a fuel pump (often submerged, but sometimes externalto the tank), a fuel filter, various valves, a recirculation line, testports, flow rate sensors, and/or a connection to a carburetor (in oldervehicles), or the fuel injectors (in most late model vehicles), and/or afuel “rail” which feeds the fuel injectors. That list, by the way, isnot exclusive but serves to illustrate that each system component has atleast one mechanical/fluid coupling that can be tampered with to accessthe fuel. Additionally, there might be some such fluid couplings betweenotherwise separate tubes, pipes, hoses, etc. which convey fuel throughthe vehicle. All of these couplings, components, etc. represent fuelsystem “entry points” and render the fuel therein subject to theft.

Such risks, moreover, do not exist with land-based vehicles alone.Rather the cars, trucks, lorries, vans, etc. which exist on the roadsrepresent just one category of susceptible vehicle. Aircraft (forinstance, helicopters, prop-driven planes, jet planes, etc.), marinevehicles (for instance, boats, hovercraft, tugboats, crane boats, etc.)and other categories of vehicles also stand at risk of fuel-theft.Aviation fuel (av-gas, jet A, mogas) which sells at a premium comparedto even automobile gasoline, not to mention diesel represents aparticularly “rich” target at unguarded airports, airfields, and thelike. Of course, elevated prices and/or scarcity (whether local,regional, or otherwise) aggravate the threat.

Similar considerations apply to cargo which the trucks and/or othervehicles might be carrying. For instance, in poor areas, food, water,beverages, etc. might be highly prized and deemed worthy of attemptedtheft and/or other types of misappropriation. More valuable cargo suchas consumer electronic devices might be sought after with less thanethical characters willing to steal these products from their employers,others, etc. And, of course, rarer merchandise such as gold, jewelry,money itself (conveyed in armored vehicles) could become targeted fortheft. Furthermore, whole shipments need not be stolen for a shipper tosuffer significant losses particularly if viewed over time. Forinstance, even legitimate customers of the shipper might be tempted totake advantage of the lack of security typically present when a truckarrives at their facility. In such situations, some persons might removetheir legitimately ordered cargo and then proceed to take more cargothan they ordered or are otherwise entitled to take. In the alternative,or in addition, such persons might fraudulently claim that cargo wasmissing from a shipment when in fact it was present. And, of course,other scenarios too numerous to list here can give rise to discrepanciesassociated with cargo shipments. Such issues extend beyond emergingcountries. According to the FBI, cargo theft has reached an epidemicportion averaging up to 30$ billion lost annually in just the UnitedStates of America.

SUMMARY

The following presents a simplified summary in order to provide anunderstanding of some aspects of the disclosed subject matter. Thissummary is not an extensive overview of the disclosed subject matter,and is not intended to identify key/critical elements or to delineatethe scope of such subject matter. A purpose of the summary is to presentsome concepts in a simplified form as a prelude to the more detaileddisclosure that is presented herein. The current disclosure providessystems, apparatus, methods, etc. for detecting potential fuel theft andmore particularly for detecting fuel theft related events associatedwith vehicles such as planes, boats, automobiles, and trucks among othervehicles.

Some embodiments provide fuel anti-theft systems for vehicles whichpossess fuel systems defining a plurality of fluid entry points. Systemsof the current embodiment nominally include a pre-selected number ofsensors which are positioned at the entry points. Each sensor defines anominal/secure state and a potentially tampered-with state. Thepotentially tampered-with state is indicative of the sensor beingabsent. The actual states of the sensors combining to create an actualcombined state of the sensors. In contrast, the nominal states of thepre-selected number of sensors combine to create a nominal combinedstate of the pre-selected number of sensors. Furthermore, a controllerof the system senses the actual combined state of the sensors anddetermines whether the actual combined state of the sensors is thenominal combined state of the pre-selected number of sensors. Responsivethereto, the controller generates a signal which indicates whether allof the pre-selected number of sensors are present and un-tampered-with.

In accordance with various embodiments, the current disclosure alsoprovides fuel anti-theft methods. Some such methods comprise a varietyof activities including sensing a combined signal from a plurality ofsensors positioned at entry points of a vehicle fuel system. Each sensordefines a secure state and a suspect state (indicative of the sensorbeing absent) in accordance with the current embodiment. Moreover, thesecure sensor states of a number of the sensors nominally in the systemcombine to create a secure system state. Such methods also comprisedetermining whether the combined signal about equals the secure systemstate (for the number of sensors in the system) and outputting acorresponding signal.

If desired, the sensing of the combined signal can be via a vehiclechassis ground and/or the sensors can be nominally wired in parallel. Insome situations a resistor contributes to the combined signal. Inaddition, or in the alternative, such methods can further comprisenoting the location of the vehicle when the signal fails to indicatethat the combined signal is indicative of the secure system state forthe number of sensors.

Various embodiments provide fuel anti-theft controllers including acircuit and/or sensors which define nominal (secure) and tampered-withstates. The tampered-with states are indicative of the sensor(s) beingabsent. The controllers of the current embodiment, moreover, sense acombined state of (all of a pre-selected number of) the sensors anddetermine therefrom whether all of the pre-selected number of sensorsare present and secure. In some embodiments, the controller senses thesensors (which can be wired in parallel) via a vehicle chassis ground.If desired, a resistor (which is about electrically equivalent to one ormore of the sensors) and/or a geo-positioning unit can be connected tothe controller. The sensors can include normally open switches andclamps which close the switches when installed properly. The sensors canbe secured by other means such as fasteners, cable ties, zip ties,adhesives, etc. Some sensors include grounding straps while othersinclude ground return leads. In some embodiments, sensors are positionedat the vehicle fuel cap and/or fuel filter.

Various embodiments provide anti-theft controllers comprising cargoswitch inputs, outputs, and circuits in communication therewith. Theinputs of the current embodiment are configured to sense the grounds ofthe cargo vehicles on which they are installed through a cargo switch.Cargo switches of the current embodiment serve at least two purposes.More specifically, they provide an interface for access requests andthey detect whether the door is shut or open. Systems of embodimentsinclude other security feature such as infrared sensors, proximitysensors Hall effect sensors, RFID (Radio Frequency Identification)sensors, optical sensors, etc. to provide additional insight as to thestate of the cargo switch and/or its environs. Further, some controllersare configured such that if a wire in an input circuit breaks (or isbroken by someone), these controllers interpret that condition asindicative of tampering and thus raise an alarm.

Meanwhile, the outputs are configured to be in communication withelectronically operated locks. The circuits are in communication withthe inputs and the outputs and are configured to detect openings of thecargo switches via pre-selected voltages at the cargo switch inputs.Responsive thereto, moreover, the circuits are configured to activatethe locks via the outputs. In the current embodiment the cargo switchesare mechanically coupled to cargo access points on the cargo vehicles sothat the cargo access points cannot be opened without opening the cargoswitches.

In some embodiments the circuits further comprise geo-positioningoutputs and the circuits are further configured to output a signalindicative of the opening of the cargo switch via the geo-positioningoutput. In addition, or in the alternative thereto, controllers canfurther comprise geo-zone inputs and are further configured to outputsignals to unlock the lock only in pre-selected geo-zones. In somesituations the pre-selected voltage differs form 12 VDC and can beuser-selected.

Furthermore, the controller can be further configured to sense a PIN(personal identification number) associated with openings and closingsof the cargo switch, keypad, audio knock sequence, cellular phone(carried by the user), etc. In some of these cases, the controller canalso be configured to change the PIN (Personal Identification Number).On the mechanical side of things, the controller can include or becoupled to a coupler which securely couples it to the cargo vehicle. Itcan also (or instead) comprise a lock position input and be configuredto sense a position of the lock via it. Such controllers, furthermore,can be configured to output a signal indicating that the lock shouldlock responsive to the position of the lock. Some controllers, locks,and/or other system components moreover comprise a battery to powerthemselves.

To the accomplishment of the foregoing and related ends, certainillustrative aspects are described herein in connection with the annexedfigures. These aspects are indicative of various non-limiting ways inwhich the disclosed subject matter may be practiced, all of which areintended to be within the scope of the disclosed subject matter. Othernovel and/or nonobvious features will become apparent from the followingdetailed disclosure when considered in conjunction with the figures andare also within the scope of the disclosure.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FIGURES

The detailed description is described with reference to the accompanyingfigures. In the figures, the left-most digit(s) of a reference numberusually corresponds to the figure in which the reference number firstappears. The use of the same reference numbers in different figuresusually indicates similar or identical items.

FIG. 1 illustrates vehicles subject to fuel theft.

FIG. 2 illustrates a fuel anti-theft system installed on a vehicle.

FIG. 3 schematically illustrates a fuel anti-theft system.

FIG. 4 illustrates a fuel anti-theft controller.

FIG. 5 illustrates a fuel anti-theft clamp sensor.

FIG. 6 illustrates a stationary fuel anti-theft sensor.

FIG. 7 illustrates a fuel anti-theft sensor installed on a fuel cap.

FIG. 8 illustrates a fuel anti-theft sensor installed on a fuel filter.

FIG. 9 illustrates a fuel anti-theft sensor installed on a fuel suctionline.

FIG. 10 illustrates a fuel anti-theft sensor installed on a fuel returnline.

FIG. 11 illustrates a graphical user interface (GUI) of a fuelanti-theft system.

FIG. 12 illustrates a flowchart of a method of sensing fuel theft.

FIG. 13 illustrates a computer for use in fuel anti-theft systems.

FIG. 14 schematically illustrates a fuel anti-theft system.

FIG. 15 illustrates a fuel anti-theft control unit.

FIGS. 16 and 17 illustrate a fuel line sensor.

FIG. 18 illustrates a fuel cap sensor.

FIG. 19 illustrates a cargo anti-theft system.

FIG. 20 illustrates another cargo anti-theft system.

FIG. 21 illustrates an installed anti-theft controller.

FIG. 22 schematically illustrates a cargo anti-theft system.

FIG. 23 schematically illustrates another cargo anti-theft system.

FIG. 24 illustrates a cargo switch and a pair of cab to trailerconnectors.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

This document discloses systems, apparatus, methods, etc. for detectingpotential fuel theft and more particularly for detecting fuel theftrelated events associated with vehicles such as planes, boats,automobiles, and trucks among other vehicles.

FIG. 1 illustrates vehicles subject to fuel theft. More particularly,FIG. 1 illustrates a concrete truck 102, a delivery truck 104, abulldozer 106, a generator trailer 108, a ship 110, a fuel tank 120, anentry point 122, an anti-theft controller 130, and an antenna 132. Thesevehicles 102, 104, 106, 108, and 110 (among others) have a number ofcommon traits. For one thing, they all contain fuels of various typeswhich are all at least somewhat valuable. Moreover, the owners,operators, and other users associated with them take and/or leave themat locations which are often remote from other users and at whichwitnesses of a potential fuel theft might be far and few between. In thealternative, or in addition, many potential witnesses might not careenough to report suspicious activities or might even be sympathetic tothose who would undertake such actions. Thus, these vehicles and/or thefuel in them are susceptible to fuel-theft from time to time.

For instance, consider the delivery truck 104. A driver often takes thedelivery truck 104 on routes delivering and/or picking up various goodsand/or delivering various services. Those routes might take the driverinto areas far from a depot, station, or other location at which thetruck is normally garaged, parked, etc. Those garages are typicallystaffed by the owner of the delivery truck 104 and/or employees or otheragents of the owner. Thus, if a driver desires to take fuel from thedelivery truck 104 in a manner not authorized by the owner, it is likelythat the driver will wait to do so until they are on a route orsupposedly on a route.

When they feel ready to take the fuel, the driver will typically stopthe truck in a spot “suitable” for doing so and exit its cab. They willthen often find an entry point 122 in the fuel system of the deliverytruck 104 through which to access the fuel. For instance, they will takethe fuel cap off of the fuel tank 120, insert a hose into the fuel tank120, and siphon fuel from the fuel tank 120. Subsequently, such driverswill either put the fuel to their personal use, sell it, or make someother unauthorized use of the fuel. Such fuel thefts (alone and/orcumulatively) can represent a significant loss for the owner of thedelivery truck 104. Of course, any vehicle which contains fuel stands atrisk of such thefts. Indeed, it was estimated in 2013 that fuel theftscost the economy of Mexico alone 2-4 Billion $US annually. See TheAftermath Of Mexico's Fuel Theft Epidemic: Examining The Texas BlackMarket And The Conspiracy To Trade In Stolen Condensate by Luke B.Reinhart, May 9, 2014.

Some embodiments provide systems for detecting potential fuel thefts andfor alerting owner and/or other users of such activities. As FIG. 1further shows the fuel anti-theft controller 130 can be mounted in, oron, the delivery truck 104 to detect activity which might indicate thatsomeone might have stolen fuel, is stealing fuel, and/or is about tosteal fuel. The fuel anti-theft controller 130 is typically connected toa plurality of sensors located at entry points to the vehicle's fuelsystem and monitors the same for potential tampering.

The sensors cause the fuel anti-theft controller 130 to generate asignal should some activity, condition, etc. cause one or more of thesensors to change state from a secure state to a tampered-with state orshould a sensor appear to be missing from the system (whether suddenlyor not). Moreover, the fuel anti-theft controller 130 of embodimentscommunicates and/or cooperates with an onboard geo-positioning unit,computer, etc. to time stamp and/or location stamp such occurrences.Further still, the fuel anti-theft controller 130, the geo-positioningsystem 132, and/or some other device on the delivery truck 104 cantransmit information regarding such occurrences to remoteowner/operators, central alarm consoles, etc.

FIG. 2 illustrates a fuel anti-theft system installed on a vehicle. Moreparticularly, FIG. 2 illustrates a fuel system 200, the anti-theftsystem 201, a fuel tank 202, a fuel pump 204, a fuel filter 206, anengine 208, a fuel cap 210, a fuel inlet (tube, pipe, etc.) 211, asecondary fuel pump 212, a fuel pressure regulator 218, a fuel returnline 220, a coupling 222, sensors 223, 225, and 227, cables 224, 226,and 228, a controller 230, a geo-positioning unit 232, and a conduit240. At this juncture, a brief discussion of the fuel system 200 of atypical vehicle might be beneficial.

As those skilled in the art will appreciate, most vehicles include afuel system 200 to deliver fuel stored in a fuel tank 202 to the engine208. Those fuel systems 200 are replete with entry points making thefuel therein susceptible to theft. More particularly, in commercialvehicles in particular, the fuel tank 202 can contain hundreds ofgallons of fuel, each gallon of which being valued at several US dollarsas of this writing.

The fuel cap 210 presents one of the many entry points associated with atypical vehicular fuel system. Moreover, the fuel cap 210 is usuallylocated in an easily accessible location making it particularlyattractive to thieves as an entry point. Moreover, often the fuel inlet211 and fuel tank 202 are formed integrally with one another (or arewelded together or otherwise permanently coupled). Yet, in vehicles inwhich they are separate components, the coupling between these twocomponents represents another entry point in that the coupling can bedisconnected allowing fuel to drain out of (or be pumped out of) thefuel system 200. Many fuel tanks 202, furthermore, contain a secondaryfuel pump 212 or have it mounted in close proximity thereto. Thus, thesecondary fuel pump 212 of some vehicles presents another systemcoupling (or even a pair thereof), and therefore, an entry point.

From the fuel tank 202, a fuel line runs to another fuel systemcomponent (as illustrated by FIG. 2) such as the primary fuel pump 204.Again, this component presents another pair of entry points renderingthe fuel vulnerable to theft. The fuel filter 206, fuel pressureregulator 218, engine 208, and fuel return line 220, all includecouplings that also render the fuel vulnerable. Moreover, vehiclemanufacturers sometimes find it desirable to use two or more pieces oftubing, piping, hose, etc. to route fuel from one component to another.As a result, a coupling 222 can appear in many places apart from thediscrete components illustrated by FIG. 2. As noted, therefore, typicalfuel systems 200 are replete with entry points which render the fuelcontained in the systems vulnerable to theft.

With continuing reference to FIG. 2, embodiments provide anti-theftsystems 201 on vehicles such as delivery truck 104. The anti-theftsystem 201 of the current embodiment includes the controller 230, thegeo-positioning unit 232, the sensors 223, 225, and 227, and the cables224, 226, and 228 among other things. The controller 230 of the currentembodiment resides in the crew cabin of the vehicle and, moreparticularly, can be mounted in the dashboard or at some locationrelatively inaccessible to users of the vehicle. The geo-positioningunit 232 can also reside in the cabin although, if desired, it can belocated in an accessible area of the cabin. In the alternative, or inaddition, the geo-positioning unit 232 can be a component of thecontroller 230. The sensors 223, 225, and 227 are clamped to thecouplings 222 and/or other components of the fuel system 200 whichrepresent entry points. The cables 224, 226 and 228 run from the sensors223, 225, and 227 to the controller 230 and also (in the currentembodiment) run through conduits 240.

The cables 224, 226, and 228 provide electrical conductivity between thesensors 223, 225, and 227 and the controller 230 and, therefore, allowthe controller 230 to sense the state of the sensors (as a group in thecurrent embodiment). Furthermore, the conduits 240 provide protection tothe cables 224, 226, and 228 from mechanical damage arising from abuse,neglect, outright tampering, etc. The conduits 240 (and, for thatmatter, the cables 224, 226, and 228) can be disguised to appear to beOEM (original equipment manufacturer), after-market, etc. equipment thathas been on the vehicle for some time. The conduits 240 can be (amongother things) a piece of cable sheathing, braided hose, corrugatedconduit (of type SM-1216-BK and available from Sealcon LLC located on7374 S. Eagle St, Centennial CO 80112 etc. and/or can be smeared withdirt, grease, grime, etc. normally available on the vehicle or createdfor such purposes.

As is further disclosed with reference to FIGS. 3 and 5-10, the sensors223, 225, and 227 include normally open switches and clamps. The clampsare configured to hold the sensors against the variouscouplings/components and (by doing so) to urge the switches toward theirclosed positions. It is these closed positions (collectively, in thecurrent embodiment) which indicate that the fuel system 200 is secureand/or un-tampered-with. Indeed, should even one of the switches open(or a sensor disappear from the anti-theft system 201), the controller230 of the current embodiment will interpret that event as an indicationthat some user might be tampering with the fuel system 200 and/orattempting to gain access to the fuel via a monitored entrypoint/coupling/component.

FIG. 3 schematically illustrates a fuel anti-theft system. Moreparticularly, FIG. 3 illustrates an anti-theft system 300, an exteriorsubsystem 304, a remote alert center 306, the Internet “Cloud,” asatellite 308, a sensor network 310, a set of resistors 312, sensors318, sensor switches 320, sensor resistances 322, resistors 324, acontroller 330, geo-positioning unit 332, a comparator 334, an antenna338, and a local indicator 340. If desired a processor could be usedinstead of, or in addition to the comparator 334. In such cases, theprocessor could be configured with an analog input to sense theresistors and/or to determine whether the system is secure or haspotentially been tampered with.

Thus, the anti-theft system 300 allows the controller 330 to communicatewith the remote alert center 306 via the Cloud 309 and/or via ageo-positioning system including its satellites 308 and/or otherinfrastructure). If the controller 330 should issue an alert, therefore,the remote alert center 306 can receive the alert via either the cloud,the geo-positioning system, and/or some other telecommunications system(such as a cellular telephone system). Users and/or servers, computers,etc. in communication with the remote alert center 306 can monitor,react to, data mine, etc. these alerts and/or take corrective action.For instance, a vehicle owner could investigate the alerts, place thevehicle/driver under surveillance, etc.

With continuing reference to FIG. 3, the controller 330 resides on avehicle as does much of the rest of the anti-theft system 300 of thecurrent embodiment. For instance, each of the sensors 318 resides on thevehicle and comprises a normally open switch 320 and often some(inherent) internal resistance 322. Of course, that internal resistances322 might be associated with internal interconnects of the sensors 318,its external wiring, connections there between, etc. However, in someembodiments, various sensors 318 comprise resistors of about 10 k-ohm,5.1 k-ohm or 3.3 k-ohm with a 1% tolerance. As a result, each sensor 318of the current embodiment will nominally have two states: a secure stateand a potentially tampered-with state. In the secure state, the sensors318 have their normally open switches 320 clamped closed by a clampwhich secures the sensors on their respective components. Thus, thesensor 318 (wired in parallel with the other sensors 318) contributesits conductance/resistance 322 to the overall sensor network 310. But,in the potentially tampered-with state, the normally open switches 320are open so that the sensors 318 appear to be electrical “open” pathsthereby contributing no conductance and/or an infinite resistance to thesensor network 310.

Thus, when an anti-theft system 300 is installed and operating nominallyon a vehicle, all of the switches 320 of the sensors 318 are held closedby the clamps and are sensed accordingly by the controller 330. But, ifone or more sensors 318 are tampered-with, a corresponding number ofswitches 320 are likely to open thereby changing the overallresistance/conductance of the sensor network 310. Furthermore, thecontroller 330 (and/or its comparator 334) can be configured to sensewhether the nominal conductance/resistance of the sensor network 310 ispresent or whether it has been altered. More specifically, thecomparator 334 can be configured to produce a signal based on whether ornot a known/pre-selected number of sensors 318 are present with theirnormally open switches 320 in the closed position.

Thus, the expected, overall, combined resistance/conductance of thesensor network would be:

R _(secure)=1/n*R _(sensor)

Where:

-   -   R_(secure) is the expected, overall resistance of the sensor        network,    -   n is the pre-selected number of sensors 318 (resistances 322),        and    -   R_(sensor) is the resistance 322 of one sensor 318.

A power supply 335 (internal to the controller 330 of the currentembodiment) can supply a trickle current to the sensor network 310.Furthermore, the comparator 334 can be configured to monitor the sensornetwork 310 for changes in the voltage across the sensor network 310that correspond to the pre-selected number of sensors 318 being in theirsecure state and present in the sensor network 310. Of course, anyresistance 315 associated with the chassis ground path can be accountedfor in this determination by reference to the following equations:

R _(expected) =R _(secure) +R _(chassis)

Where:

-   -   R_(expected) is the expected resistance and    -   R_(chassis) is the resistance 315 of the chassis ground path.

And

V _(expected) =I _(controller) *R _(expected)

Where:

-   -   V_(expected) is the expected voltage and    -   I_(controller) is the current supplied by the controller.

Thus, should the voltage sensed by the comparator 334 increase by aboutthe amount associated with one of the switches 320 opening (or a sensor318 being removed from the sensor network 310), the controller 330 cangenerate a signal indicative of potential tampering with the fuel system200. Of course, the set point of the comparator 334 can be adjusted toaccount for tolerances associated with the foregoing parameters. Notethat if the chassis resistance 315 is low, that voltage change wouldcorrespond to an increase of the resistance of the sensor network of:

ΔR _(tamper) =R _(expected) −t/R _(secure);

ΔV _(tamper) ≧I _(controller) *ΔR _(tamper); or

V _(tamper) =V _(epected) ΔV _(tamper)

-   -   Where t is the number of open/missing sensors

Since there might be scenarios in which users might want to install moresensors 318 than the number that a particular controller 330 isconfigured for, the set point of the comparator 334 can be adjusteddownward by an amount corresponding to the addition of additionalsensors 318 (and their additional conductances across the parallelsensor network 310). Of course, an additional controller 330 could beadded to the anti-theft system 300 to provide capacity for additionalsensors 318. Should users wish to use fewer than the pre-selected numberof sensors 318, then users can place a corresponding number (and value)of resistors 324 across the inputs to the controller 330 to emulate theun-installed sensors 318. Those resistors 324, moreover, could be in thesame (or another) secure location as the controller 330 itself. In otherembodiments, the resistors 324 could be supplied via DIP (dual in-line)switches or similar devices in or associated with the controller 330. Inthe alternative, or in addition, the unused sensors 318 could beconnected to the controller 330 and clamped such that the normally openswitches 320 remain closed.

In some embodiments, the controller 330 is configured to work inconjunction with 10 (ten) sensors 318. Moreover, in the currentembodiment, each sensor 318 has a resistance of approximately 10 k-ohm.Thus, the sensor network 310 has an electrically equivalent resistanceof 1 k-ohm. Table 1, below, lists electrically equivalent resistancesfor sensor networks 310 having various pre-selected numbers of sensors318 and lists electrically equivalent resistances for sensor networks310 (of the current embodiment) with various numbers of open switches320.

TABLE 1 No. of Sensors No. of Open Sensors Resistance (k-ohm) 1 9 10 2 85 3 7 3.33 4 6 2.5 5 5 2 6 4 1.67 7 3 1.43 8 2 1.25 9 1 1.11 10 0 1

Thus, should a user attempt to tamper with the fuel system 200, thecontroller 330 would sense it. For instance, removing one of the sensors318 (either physically or electronically) from the sensornetwork/anti-theft system 201 would cause the corresponding electricalpath to open thereby increasing the voltage to beyond the comparator 334set point. Unclamping a sensor 318 would open the switch 320 leading tothe same result. Attempting to first (before otherwise tampering with afuel system) place a resistor of the same resistance as the sensorresistance 322 would result in a decrease in voltage which could causethe comparator 334 (if configured to sense voltages outside of a band)to sense an attempt to tamper with the fuel system 200 also (even iftemporarily). And comparators 334 of some embodiments could beconfigured to latch the output signal in such situations.

With ongoing reference to FIG. 3, the signal output by the comparator334 could serve several purposes. For one such purpose, it could cause alocal indicator 340 to signal potential tampering. Of course, someembodiments either do not provide a local indicator 340 or provide it ata location not accessible to the normal users of the vehicle (forinstance, the driver). The local indicator 340 could be hidden in alocked compartment or it could be provided within the housing of thecontroller 330 and, thus, available only to service technicians and/orothers with the proper authority/tools to open the controller 330. Thecomparator signal could also be communicated to the geo-positioning unit332.

The geo-positioning unit 332 could be configured to perform a variety ofactivities. For instance, it could (responsive to the comparator 334signal) time and/or location stamp the occurrence(s) of the signal.Furthermore, the geo-positioning unit 332 could transmit suchinformation to the remote alert center 306 via some telecommunicationssystem. Additionally, or in the alternative, the geo-positioning unit332 could track the location, speed, movement, lack of movement, etc. ofthe vehicle and transmit such information to the remote alert center306. Thus, the anti-theft system 300 of embodiments can alert users(such as owners) to potential tampering with the fuel systems 200 ofvarious vehicles.

FIG. 4 illustrates a fuel anti-theft controller. The controller 400 ofthe current embodiment includes a tamper-resistant housing 402 and anumber of leads 404 hardwired to the controller 400. Thetamper-resistant housing 402 can be any sort of housing sufficient toeither prevent users from physically entering the housing or at leastsufficiently strong that most significant attempts to do so would leavepry marks, dents, scrapes, etc. on the housing. Thus, attempts to enterthe controller 400 (and/or alter its internal components such as thecomparator 334) could be readily evident upon inspection of the housing.The leads 404 can also contribute to the security of the anti-theftsystem 300. For instance, internal to the tamper-resistant housing 402,they can terminate in soldered, brazed, etc. connections to a PCB(printed circuit board) or otherwise be secured against un-detectableremoval from the controller 400.

Moreover, in some embodiments, the leads 404 correspond in number to thepre-selected number of sensors 318. For instance, in embodiments inwhich every sensor 318 communicates with the controller 400 via apositive and a (ground) return lead, the controller 400 will have 2nleads (where “n” is the pre-selected number of sensors 318). However, itmight be the case that one or more sensors 318 will use the chassisground as a return path. In such situations, the number of leads 404will be reduced accordingly and the associated set of sensors 318 willbe selected with a number of return leads appropriate for controllersconfigured in that manner.

Additionally, or in the alternative, the controller 400 includes thelocal indicator 408. That local indicator 408 could be any indicatorwhich can indicate that a tampering event has been detected (and/or isongoing whether latched or not). For instance, the local indicator 408could be a light, LED (light emitting diode), counter, blowablefuse/link, etc. If the controller 400 is in a secure location (forinstance, “buried” in a dashboard) then the local indicator 408 will becorrespondingly inaccessible to most users such as the vehicle driver.Of course, the local indicator 408 could be replaced/augmented with ajack, connector, etc. allowing for a connection of the controller 400 toan external event indicator.

FIG. 5 illustrates a fuel anti-theft clamp sensor. The clamp sensor 500of the current embodiment comprises a pipe clamp 332, a band clamp 502,zip lock tie, etc. capable of securing the sensor 500 to a fuel systemcomponent such as those illustrated by FIG. 2. The clamp 502 can also,when clamped, exert sufficient force on the switch 504 so as to close it(particularly if the switch 504 is a normally open switch). The switch504 can be a normally open switch and can be positioned relative to theclamp 502 such that the clamp 502 can clamp it between the clamp and thecomponent to which the sensor 500 is clamped. In the alternative, or inaddition, the bulk of the switch 504 can be located on the outside ofthe clamp 502 with the actual electrical/mechanical switch and/or anactuator operatively coupled thereto positioned within the clamp (andsubject to being clamped in the electrically “closed” position). Note,also that the sensor could also house a resistor to set the resistance322 of the sensor 500 to a desired value if desired. Of course, theswitch 504 (and resistor therein) could be wired to the connector 506which can include conductors for both the positive and ground returnpaths associated with the sensor 500. For instance, the connector 506 ofembodiments can be a model no. 45-4610 type connector available from LKGindustries, Inc located on 3660 Publishers Dr, Rockford, Ill. 61109.Since the sensor 500 of the current embodiment has a connector 506, itcan be used to monitor entry points which are subject to relativelyfrequent and legitimate openings. For instance, sensors 500 withconnectors could be used on fuel caps 210. Note that in scenariosinvolving such entry points, the anti-theft system 300 could still beconfigured to raise an alarm when the connector 506 is disconnected (andthe corresponding conductive path opens). But, the remote alert center306 could be configured to, upon an alert, query the geo-positioningunit 332 for the location of the vehicle. If the vehicle happens to belocated at a fueling depot, gas, station, etc. that location can benoted and considered in how the alert is handled.

FIG. 6 illustrates a stationary fuel anti-theft sensor. The sensor 600of the current embodiment includes a clamp 602, a sensor package 604,and a lead 606 (or leads). The leads 606 are configured to bepermanently, mechanically coupled (and in permanent electricalcommunication) with a sensor network 310. In some cases, that couplingcan be via soldering, brazing, etc. Thus, the sensor 600 of the currentembodiment can be used to monitor entry points which, ordinarily, wouldexperience only occasional openings. In other words, they arestationary. For instance, most couplings 222 and/or other components(exempting the fuel cap 210 for most vehicles) would be opened only ifthe vehicle is undergoing maintenance. Again, by querying thegeo-positioning unit 334, checking maintenance orders/records, etc. theremote alert center 306 can determined whether the vehicle is located atan appropriate maintenance depot. The information so gained can be usedin evaluating alerts arising from the sensor 600 of the currentembodiment.

FIG. 7 illustrates a fuel anti-theft sensor installed on a fuel cap. Thesensor 700 of the current embodiment comprises a clamp 702, a sensorpackage 704, a lead 706, and a grounding strap 708. The grounding strap708 can be used to ground the sensor 700 to the vehicle chassis. Doingso ensures that the sensor 700 has a ground return path to the sensornetwork 310 despite the possibility that non-conductive material mightinterpose themselves between the sensor 700 and the chassis ground. Forinstance, OEMs (and after market manufacturers) often make fuel caps 210from plastic and/or other non-conductive materials. Moreover, evenshould such fuel system 200 components be made of conductive materials,grease, dirt, grime, etc. might exist on one or more componentsrendering them non conductive. Moreover, some components might be coatedin paint, wax, primer, etc. rendering such components non conductive. Ofcourse, the underlying components could be clamped, stripped, etc. toincrease their conductance in appropriate circumstances. Note that thegrounding strap 708 could comprise a copper wire, piece of aluminumfoil, etc. without departing from the current disclosure.

FIG. 8 illustrates a fuel anti-theft sensor installed on a fuel filter.Meanwhile, FIG. 9 illustrates a fuel anti-theft sensor installed on afuel suction line and FIG. 10 illustrates a fuel anti-theft sensorinstalled on a fuel return line. Thus, FIGS. 8-10 illustrate thatsensors 800, 900, and 1000 of embodiments can be installed at manylocations throughout fuel systems 200 for many different types ofvehicles.

FIG. 11 illustrates a graphical user interface (GUI) of a fuelanti-theft system. More particularly, FIG. 11 shows the GUI 1100, and amap 1102, a route 1104, a destination 1105, a detour 1106, calendaringcontrols 1108, map controls 1110, route markers 1112, route cautions1114, route warnings 1116, a home tab 1118, a maps tab 1120, reports tab1122, and an administrative tab 1124. The GUI 1100 and underlyingsoftware application, program, etc. can be hosted by remote alertcenters 306, servers, computers, mobile devices (for instance, cellulartelephones, laptops, tablets, notebooks, etc.) among others. The GUI1100 of the current embodiment allows users to monitor, explore,investigate, etc. activities which might be related to vehicular fueltheft.

More specifically, the GUI 1100 illustrated in FIG. 11 displays a map1102 on which the route 1104 of a user-selected vehicle is displayed.That route 1104 includes one or more intended destinations 1105 such asa local shop, business, factory, etc. and, as displayed, a detour 1106.Moreover, the actual route 1104 (including the detour 1106) can berendered based on geo-positioning data provided by the geo-positioningcircuit 334 and/or queried therefrom. Note also that scheduled deliveryroutes could be displayed on the GUI 1100. Of course, the detour 1106might be legitimate such as where the driver acted to avoid congestion,construction, flooding, etc. On the other hand, that detour 1106 couldindicate a location at which the driver has tampered-with, is tamperingwith, and/or is about to tamper with the fuel system 200.

FIG. 11 also shows that the GUI 1100 can display various route markers1112, route cautions 1114, and/or route warnings 1116. The route markers1112 can be displayed corresponding to the locations at which thevehicle is proceeding at (or above) a user selected speed such as thelocal speed limit. In contrast, the route cautions 1114 can be displayedfor locations at which the vehicle has slowed to below a user selectedspeed. Such behavior might be indicative of traffic/road relateddifficulties and/or imminent fuel system tampering. The GUI 1100 alsoshows several route warnings 1116 which correspond to locations at whichthe vehicle has slowed below some user-selected speed and/or stopped.Such behavior could be indicative of imminent or ongoing fuel systemtampering and/or fuel theft. Note that the vehicle speeds, location,etc. can be obtained remotely by querying the fuel anti-theft system 300of embodiments and/or other onboard systems. Thus, users such as ownerscan examine the map 1102 to determine where/when fuel theft might beoccurring and/or patterns related thereto.

Of course, the GUI 1100 has other features as well. For instance, thecalendaring controls 1108 allow a user to see the current date/time. Insome embodiments, the calendaring controls 1108 allow users to selectdates/times for which the GUI 1100 can display corresponding maps 1102,routes 1104, route markers 1112, route cautions 114, route warnings1116, etc. Moreover, the GUI 1100 can include map controls 1110 forzooming into/out of maps 1102, navigating on maps 1102, saving maps1102, printing maps 1102, etc.

GUIs 1100 of embodiments also include controls such as the home tab1118, the maps tab 1120, the reports tab 1122, the administrative tab1124, etc. These tabs 1118, 1120, 1122, and/or 1124 allow users tonavigate between various and corresponding portions of the GUI 1100. Forinstance, the maps tab 1120 can allow users to navigate between variousmaps 1102 whereas the reports tab 1122 can provide correspondingfunctionality for various reports. The administrative tab 1124 can allowusers to handle certain administrative activities such as user profilemaintenance, vehicle profile maintenance, driver profile maintenance,etc. The home tab 1118 can provide overall GUI navigation controls suchas those related to logging in, logging in, logging out, switchingusers, etc.

FIG. 12 illustrates a flowchart of a method of sensing fuel theft. Themethod 1200 comprises various activities such as selecting one or morevehicles on which to install anti-theft systems 300. These vehiclesmight be those involved in fuel theft and/or other suspiciousactivities, a group of vehicles which for some reason might beparticularly susceptible to such activities, the vehicles driven bycertain users, etc. See reference 1202.

Method 1200 can also comprise installing the various sensors on one ormore of the selected vehicles. Thus, sensors can be clamped on to thefuel cap 210, the fuel intake 211, the fuel tank 202, the fuel pump(s)204 and/or 212, the fuel filter 206, the fuel pressure regulator 218,various fuel lines such as the fuel return line 220, and/or variouscouplings 222 in the fuel systems 200 of those vehicles. If the numberof installed sensors 318 does not equal the pre-selected number ofsensors 318 for a given controller 330, then the anti-theft system 300can be configured accordingly. For instance, if the anti-theft system300 has too many sensors 318 for the selected controller 330, then anappropriate number of controllers 330 can be added to the anti-theftsystem 300. If, though or in addition, too few sensors 318 have beeninstalled for the pre-selected number(s) of sensors associated with thenumber of controllers 330 in the anti-theft system 300, then variousresistors 324 can be connected across one or more of the controller 330inputs. Thus, the controllers 330 can be connected to sensor networks310 having overall resistances/conductances corresponding to thepre-selected number(s) of sensors 318. See reference 1204.

Of course, if the controller(s) 330 have not already been installed,then they can be installed on the vehicle. For instance, the controller330 can be mounted into the dashboard or otherwise installed at somerelatively inaccessible location on the vehicle as indicated atreference 1206. If a separate geo-positioning unit is to be included inthe anti-theft system 300, then it can be installed in/on the vehicleand/or connected to the controller. See reference 1208. Moreover, thevarious conduits 240 can be run through the vehicle from the location(s)of the sensor(s) 318 to the controller 330. The wires, cables 224, 226,and 228, grounding straps, etc. associated with the sensors can then berun through the conduits 240 and/or run separately therefrom. Ifdesired, the conduits, cables, sensors, etc. can be disguised to appearas if they have been located on the vehicle for all or a portion of thelife of the vehicle. For instance, dirt, grease, grime, etc. can beapplied to them. See reference 1209.

Reference 1210 of FIG. 12 illustrates that the vehicle may be driven atsome point. For instance, a particular driver(s) might be alerted to thepresence of the anti-theft system 300 whereas some other drivers mightbe allowed to remain unaware of its presence. One way or another, as thevehicles are driven, the data generated by the anti-theft system 300(and/or other onboard systems) can be gathered and/or monitored asindicated at references 1212 and 1214. If the data indicates that atampering event might be underway then the appropriate routecautions/warnings can be raised/transmitted to the remote alert center.If the data suggests that tampering might not be occurring then the datamonitoring can continue. See reference 1216 and 1218.

With continuing reference to FIG. 12, in scenarios involving potentialtampering (and/or otherwise), users such as vehicle owners caninvestigate activities associated with the vehicle. See reference 1220.Of course, they can take appropriate actions such as placing variousdrivers, vehicles, etc. under surveillance. Method 1200 can repeat inwhole or in part as indicated at reference 1222.

FIG. 13 illustrates a computer for use in fuel anti-theft systems.Indeed, the computer 1306 could host an application 1330 for presentingthe GUI 1100 (and processing the associated data) at the remote alertcenter. In some cases, the controller 330 could include some or all ofthe components of the computer 1306 although the controller 330 could beimplemented in analog hardware, firmware, ASICs (application specificintegrated circuits), RISC (reduced instruction set integratedcircuits), etc.

At this juncture a few words might be in order about the computer(s)1306 and/or other systems, apparatus, etc. used to design, store, host,recall, display, transmit, receive, etc. programs, applications,controllers, algorithms, routines, codes, GUIs, etc. of fuel anti-theftsystems of embodiments. The type of computer 1306 used for such purposesdoes not limit the scope of the disclosure but certainly includes thosenow known as well as those which will arise in the future. But usually,these computers 1306 will include some type of display 1308, keyboard1310, interface 1312, processor 1314, memory 1316, and bus 1318.

Indeed, any type of human-machine interface (as illustrated by display1308 and keyboard 1310) will do so long as it allows some or all of thehuman interactions with the computer 1306 as disclosed elsewhere herein.Similarly, the interface 1312 can be a network interface card (NIC), aWiFi transceiver, an Ethernet interface, etc. allowing variouscomponents of computer 1306 to communicate with each other and/or otherdevices. The computer 1306, though, could be a stand-alone devicewithout departing from the scope of the current disclosure.

Moreover, while FIG. 13 illustrates that the computer 1306 includes aprocessor 1314, the computer 1306 might include some other type ofdevice for performing methods disclosed herein. For instance, thecomputer 1306 could include a microprocessor, an ASIC (ApplicationSpecific Integrated Circuit), a RISC (Reduced Instruction Set IC), aneural network, etc. instead of, or in addition, to the processor 1314.Thus, the device used to perform the methods disclosed herein is notlimiting.

Again with reference to FIG. 13, the memory 1316 can be any type ofmemory currently available or that might arise in the future. Forinstance, the memory 1316 could be a hard drive, a ROM (Read OnlyMemory), a RAM (Random Access Memory), flash memory, a CD (CompactDisc), etc. or a combination thereof. No matter its form, in the currentembodiment, the memory 1316 stores instructions which enable theprocessor 1314 (or other device) to perform at least some of the methodsdisclosed herein as well as (perhaps) others. The memory 1316 of thecurrent embodiment also stores data pertaining to such methods, userinputs thereto, outputs thereof, etc. At least some of the variouscomponents of the computer 1306 can communicate over any type of bus1318 enabling their operations in some or all of the methods disclosedherein. Such buses include, without limitation, SCSI (Small ComputerSystem Interface), ISA (Industry Standard Architecture), EISA (ExtendedIndustry Standard Architecture), etc., buses or a combination thereof.With that having been said, it might be useful to now consider someaspects of the disclosed subject matter.

FIG. 14 schematically illustrates a fuel anti-theft system. Morespecifically, FIG. 14 illustrates a fuel anti-theft system 1400, acontrol unit 1402, line sensors 1418, an identifiable sensor 1420, anidentifiable sensor 1422, a microcontroller 1430, jacks 1432, a pull-upresistor 1434, a GPS Tracker 1436, and a GPS application 1438. The fuelanti-theft system 1400 of the current embodiment can be used wherecertain routine activities might appear to be theft-events therebytriggering false alarms. For instance, fuel caps and fuel filters aremore routinely opened/replaced than other components in typical fuelsystems.

Activations of the fuel cap and fuel filter identifiable sensors 1420and 1422 are typically more routine than activation of other sensorssuch as the line sensors 1418. Thus, users might want to respond toactivation of the identifiable sensors 1420 and/or 1422 differently thanactivation of the line sensors 1418 (and/or even each other).

The fuel anti-theft system 1400 shown in FIG. 14 produces different,identifiable resistance changes as sensed at the input to the controlunit 1802. The resistor values used for the fuel cap identifiable sensor1420 (5.1 kohm) and the fuel filter identifiable sensor 1422 (3.3 kohm)are different from each other and the line sensors 1418 (10 kohm) in thefuel anti-theft system 1400. The control unit 1402 of the currentembodiment will detect a unique resistance change value for each sensortype and take appropriate action to notify users of the activation.

Note that these differing resistance changes can be determined withreference to the following equations and/or Table 2. Note also thatwhile the foregoing resistance values were selected to be differentenough to produce readily discernible network resistance changes, otherresistance values could be used.

1/R _(secure)=1/R _(fuelcap)+1/R _(fuelfilter) +n*1/R _(fuellinesensor)

Where:

-   -   R_(secure) is the expected, overall resistance of the sensor        network,    -   R_(fuelfilter) is fuel filter sensor resistance (3.3 Kohm)    -   R_(fuelcap) is fuel cap sensor resistance (5.1 Kohm)    -   R_(fuellinesensor) is fuel line sensor resistance (10 Kohm)    -   n is the pre-selected number (usually 8 sensors)

TABLE 1 Disconnected Sensors(s) Network resistance (k-ohm) None 0.77Fuel Cap 0.9 Fuel Filter 1.004 1 Fuel Line 0.83 2 Fuel Line 0.91 3 FuelLine 1 4 Fuel Line 1.11 5 Fuel Line 1.25 6 Fuel Line 1.43 7 Fuel Line1.67 8 Fuel Line 2

FIG. 14 also illustrates that the microcontroller 1430 (and/or controlunit 1802) could include jacks 1432 for convenientconnection/disconnection of the various wires, cables, etc. in thesystem to these devices. In the alternative, or in addition, one or moreof these cables could be hardwire to the control unit 1402 and/ormicrocontroller 1430.

Further still, FIG. 14 also illustrates that the control unit 1402 canpass a signal to the GPS tracker 1436/GPS application 1438 indicative ofwhether the fuel system appears to be secure, potentially tampered with,or in some routine condition. The GPS application 1438 can be configuredto record the location of the fuel system (or vehicle) when that signalchanges and/or can send a corresponding message to various users uponsuch changes. If desired, the GPS application 1438 can be configured tosend a more or less continuous signal so that the sensed state of thesystem is known at all times. Furthermore, the GPS application can beconfigured with a user interface (such as, a graphical user interface)which allows users to create their own rules for responding to alerts.For instance, a user could configure the GPS application toautomatically disable the ignition circuit of the vehicle if an alertindicates that fuel theft might be occurring (or has occurred).

FIG. 15 illustrates a fuel anti-theft control unit. The fuel anti-theftcontrol unit 1502 of the current embodiment includes a series of jacks1532 for connecting the sensors of the network to it. It also includesseveral indicators 1518, 1520, and 1522 corresponding to the linesensors 1518 and identifiable sensors 1520 and 1522. The control unit1502 can also include an indicator 1524 configured to be activatedshould more than one sensor be activated.

FIGS. 16 and 17 illustrate a fuel line sensor. The fuel line sensor 1600of the current embodiment can be installed around compression fittings(or other components) on vehicle fuel lines. In the event that the fuelline sensor 1600 is uninstalled to allow access to the fitting (orotherwise tampered with), the internal electrical connection to thevehicle ground will be broken (or destroyed), and the microcontroller ofthe current embodiment will detect the change of state and will send analert.

Furthermore, FIG. 16 illustrates that the fuel line sensor 1600 can besecured to various components via a dual strap cable tie 1602 (or cableties, zip ties, zip locks, etc.). FIG. 16 also shows that the fuel linesensor 1600 also includes a circuit enclosure 1604 and a signal wireconnector 1606 and defines a signal wire hole 1608.

While FIG. 16 illustrates the fuel line sensor 1600 in an uninstalledcondition, FIG. 17 illustrates it as being installed on a compressionfitting nut 1710 and with a signal wire 1712 connected thereto via thesignal wire hole 1608/signal wire connector 1606. Note that the dualstrap cable tie 1602 has been pulled snug against the compressionfitting nut. 1710.

FIG. 18 illustrates a fuel cap sensor. The fuel cap (identifiable)sensor 1800 of the current embodiment can be installed on various fuelcaps. The fuel cap sensor 1800 can be secured to the fuel cap 1802 viaan adhesive while the circuit enclosure 1804 can be secured to the fueltank 1806 by an adhesive too. In the event that the fuel cap sensor 1800is unplugged to allow access to the fuel tank 1806, the circuit for thatsensor is broken and an alert is sent. When the fuel cap sensor 1800 isuninstalled (or removed by force or otherwise tampered with) it destroysits electrical connection to the vehicle ground. The microcontroller ofthe current embodiment detects the change of state and an alert is sent.

Note that FIG. 18 also illustrates a cap-side circuit enclosure 1808 andthe two halves of a quick disconnect 1810 of the fuel cap sensor 1800.Further, the tank-side or base circuit enclosure 1804 defines orincludes a signal wire attachment point 1812.

In some embodiments fuel/cargo anti-theft systems include digitalsensors which transmit their unique IDs or codes wirelessly toappropriately configured controllers. If the sensor detects that it hasbeen tampered with, removed from the system, etc., it stops transmittingits ID. Of course, the controller of the current embodiment periodicallychecks for the presence of recent/contemporaneous transmissions of theIDs associated with its sensors. Should one or more appear to be missingsuch controllers could then raise an alarm (for instance, turn on alight, buzzer, speaker, klaxon, etc.), alert, send a text message to thecontrol center, send an email to a particular person, mobile orcomputing device, cellular phone, etc. The controllers could also, or inthe alternative, record the location, time, and (if instrumentedappropriately), record conditions in/near the vehicle includingtemperature, atmospheric pressure, humidity, etc.

Furthermore, some embodiments provide fuel/cargo anti-theft systemswhich are configured to consume little power. These systems, therefore,can operate on various vehicles for extended periods of time. Systems ofthe current embodiment can be configured to operate on low voltagesand/or with limited current flow such that they meet intrinsically saferequirements for various hazardous locations as defined by suchdocuments as the National Electric Code of the United States. In someembodiments, anti-theft systems are provided in a software as a service(SaaS) form on a web server and/or database server. Thus, in someembodiments, no application need exist on the vehicle and/or in thefield.

Controllers of various embodiments condition the signal(s) which theysense from the various sensors in communication therewith. For instance,it might be desirable to filter the signal so that noise on the circuitwill not appear to be a potential case of tampering. For instance, a 6second, time-series filter can be applied to the signal beforecontrollers of the current embodiment sense/respond to the signal. Inthis manner, false alarms can be reduced if not eliminated. But othermore/less complex signal conditioning can be applied to the signalwithout departing from the scope of the current disclosure.

Embodiments provide fuel anti-theft systems, sensors, controllers, etc.which allow for the monitoring of vehicle fuel systems for potentialtampering and/or fuel theft. Some such systems allow for discreet,unobtrusive, and potentially unsuspected fuel system monitoring. In someembodiments, the sensors, controllers, systems, etc. are reliable,rugged, and relatively inexpensive to install and/or operate. Systems ofsome embodiments allow users to investigate potential fuel-theft eventsremotely and to implement corrective actions. Now with reference toFIGS. 19 to 25, it might be helpful to disclose aspects of cargoanti-theft protection systems.

FIG. 19 illustrates a cargo anti-theft system. Generally, FIG. 19 showsthe cargo anti-theft system installed on a cargo vehicle. It allows anowner or other interested user to monitor the status of cargo onvehicles even in remote locations. And should some apparent tamperingoccur, the system alerts that user of the potential that someone mightbe attempting to steal cargo or otherwise tamper with it. Morespecifically, FIG. 19 illustrates a system 1900, a vehicle 1902, a cargocompartment 1904, a cab 1906, an access point 1908, a controller 1910, ageo-positioning circuit 1912, at least one lock 1914, a cargo switch1916, and its switch halves 1918 and 1920.

As to the vehicle 1902, the particular vehicle 1902 illustrated by FIG.19 happens to be a fuel truck. However, it could be a trailer, asemi-trailer, a “cube” truck, a delivery van, a ship, a boat, anairplane, etc. However, it does include or define a cargo compartment1904 which often holds cargo and frequently confines the cargo therein.Indeed, the cargo compartment 1904 (or the structure(s) defining it)often shield the cargo from the elements, damage during shipment,tampering, theft, and the like. For instance, in many trucks, vans, etc.the cargo compartment 1904 lies within a series of walls/panels of thevehicle 1902 such as floors, roofs/ceilings, hulls, fuselages,bulkheads, etc.

Moreover, the vehicle 1902 often comprises two or more distinct partssuch as a trailer (which might define the cargo compartment) and a cab,tractor, bridge, cockpit, etc. In many scenarios, the cab hosts a userwho drives, operates, navigates, controls, etc. the vehicle 1902. Thatuser also frequently has duties pertaining to loading cargo onto thevehicle 1902 (and/or unloading it). Thus, while not always the case, theuser has access to the entire vehicle 1902 including the cargocompartment 1904, the cab 1906, and/or the cargo itself. Of course,third parties might also attempt to gain access to the cargo compartment1904, the cargo therein, and/or the cab 1906 for perhaps nefariousand/or malicious purposes. And, in part, the cargo compartment 1904 isoften protected with locks on its various access points 1908 to preventor at least hinder such unauthorized access.

As further disclosed elsewhere herein, the cab 1906 usually containscontrols and/or instruments to aid the user in operating the vehicle.And it can contain various components of the system 1900 such as thecontroller 1910 and/or geo-positioning circuit 1912. Of course, one ormore of these components can be mounted on the roof of the cab 1906and/or the cargo compartment 1904 to, for instance, provide its antenna(if it has one) access to electromagnetic signals that might otherwisebe shielded by the structure of the vehicle 1902. Of course the cab 1906can be protected from unauthorized access by locks and the like as wellto protect these components and other objects in the cab 1906. Note thatcomponents mounted outside of the cargo compartment 1904 and cab 1906can be somewhat hidden by being camouflaged or placed in inconspicuouslocations. For instance, many vehicles 1902 are tall enough that acomponent mounted on top of the vehicle 1902 might not be noticed by theuser and/or third parties who might be unaware of the presence of thesystem 1900.

The access point 1908 takes on various configurations and the one shownin FIG. 19 happens to be a valve box for a fuel truck. This valve boxcontains valves which are in communication with the fuel in the truck(i.e., the cargo) and load/unload ports, couplings, etc. In otherinstances, the access point 1908 could be a door, hatch, manway, etc.And, of course, the access point 1908 will usually reflect the nature ofthe cargo and/or the vehicle 1902 whether the cargo is solid, liquid,gaseous, packages, granular, bulk material, money, etc.

With continuing reference to FIG. 19, the controller 1910 performscertain functions and/or communicates with various other components ofthe system 1900 to do so. For instance, the controller 1910 can sensethe position, state, and/or condition of the cargo switch 1916 and fromthat information infer whether or not an attempt to access the cargocompartment 1904 might be underway. It can also send a signal indicativeof the position of the cargo switch 1916 to the geo-positioning circuit1912. Moreover, it can store a PIN (Personal Identification Number)associated with the openings and/or closings of the cargo switch 1904and determine whether the cargo switch 1916 has been opened/closed in apattern corresponding to that PIN. If it has, then the controller 1910can send a signal to the geo-positioning circuit 1912 that an authorizedentry (or access) to the cargo compartment 1904 is underway. If thepattern fails to match the PIN, then the controller 1910 can signal thegeo-positioning circuit 1912 accordingly. For instance, should the PINbe 3124, a user would open and close the cargo switch 3 times taking apre-selected amount of time between opening/closing the switch, pausefor another pre-selected (and perhaps longer) time, open/close theswitch once, wait, open/close the switch twice, wait, and open/close theswitch 4 more times to enter that PIN. In some embodiments, thecontroller 1910 stores (or retrieves from a remote control center overthe Internet or other telecommunications system) a list of PINs and,each time one is used, it deletes the used PIN. It then loads anotherPIN from the list to be the next active/correct PIN. In this way, userscan signal the system 1900 that they have authority to access the cargocompartment 1904 once (or a pre-determined number of times) withouttriggering an alarm (but perhaps causing the transmission of anauthorized access signal).

In the alternative, or in addition, PINs can be time-based. In otherwords, each digit of the pin can indicate how long the user should holdthe cargo switch 1916 in the open/mated and closed/de-mated positions.For instance, suppose the PIN is 315. To signal the controller that anauthorized cargo access is imminent, the user would open the switch,then close it for 3 seconds. The user would then close the switch for a(1) second and close it for 5 seconds. Upon the end of the 5 secondperiod the user would open the switch and access the cargo withoutsetting off an alarm. Although the controller 1910 could log the eventand send a signal indicative thereof.

The controller 1910 can also control the lock(s) 1914 via encodedcommunications if desired. Indeed, if an authorized entry appears to beunder way (as sensed via the PIN for instance) the controller 1910 cansend a signal to the lock 1914 to open. The lock is typically installedinside the cargo bay making it inaccessible from outside and thereforemaking tampering with it difficult. Of course, the controller can alsolock the lock 1914 in other scenarios. For instance, the default,loss-of-power, and/or fail-safe state of the signal and/or the lockcould be in the locked state. In some embodiments, the controller 1910could also receive an override signal to unlock the lock from a remotecontrol center (and perhaps over a telecommunications system).Furthermore, the controller 1910 of embodiments can receive from thegeo-positioning circuit 1912 a signal indicating whether the system 1900is in a geozone wherein entry can be deemed either authorized orunauthorized. Thus, the system 1900 can establish, maintain, sense, etc.whether the vehicle 1902 is in a location where access to the cargocompartment 1904 is authorized. Those locations can correspond toexpected/scheduled destinations for the vehicle and/or cargo. Again, ifaccess is attempted in a location other than an authorized geolocationthen the controller 1910 can raise an alarm. In this manner, and/orothers, the system 1900 can create “geofences” around legitimate accessareas.

Of course, it might happen that a legitimate but unauthorized attemptmight be made to access the cargo compartment 1904. For instance, thevehicle 1902 might be stopped by law enforcement such as the highwaypatrol, police, an immigration service, an alcoholic beverage controlagency, a firearms agency, a customs officer, etc. In which case, theoperator might be ordered to open the cargo compartment 1904 forinspection and/or search. In such cases the operator can obtain a PINfrom the control center (or have one memorized or otherwise available)and obtain authorization in that or a similar manner. Likewise,unscheduled maintenance might cause the operator to legitimately needaccess to the cargo compartment and the PIN can allow for that. And, ofcourse, many other situations might arise where such access islegitimately needed. In such cases the controller 1910 can still reportthat access occurred for subsequent follow up by interested users.

In addition, the controller 1910 can be in communication with a batteryto receive and/or distribute power to the system 1900. That battery,moreover, could be an internal battery. Of course, the controller 1910could receive power from the vehicle 1902, a solar panel 1930 (whetheron the controller or external), a battery, or some other power source.However, that might not always be the case. For instance, when thecontroller is located in the cargo compartment 1904, vehicle power mightnot be available because the cab 1906 is no longer present. Or vehiclepower could fail. Thus, it might be the case that the controller 1910loses power and is consequently unpowered. In such instances, thegeo-positioning circuit 1912 can detect the loss of the controller 1910via the lack of signals coming from the controller and report that thecontroller is no longer powered and/or present. It can also report thelocation at which it currently resides to the control center. Thus,follow up activities can determine whether a mere power failureoccurred, whether the controller was tampered with, destroyed, disabled,removed, etc. Moreover, in such situations, it will be known where thegeo-positioning circuit 1912 (and presumably the vehicle 1902) was atthe time of the incident and perhaps afterward as well.

Note also that the controller 1910 can communicate with the controlcenter directly over its own telecommunications link (for instance, acellular telephony link). It can also, or instead, be configured tocommunicate therewith via the geo-positioning circuit 1912. And, in someembodiments, it can be configured to do both. Moreover, while someembodiments provide for hard wired communications/connections with thevarious other components of the system 1900, that need not be the case.For instance, the entire system 1900 or select components thereof couldcommunicate with each other via WiFi, infrared, RFID, Bluetooth,Zigbee®, etc. technology.

With ongoing reference to FIG. 19, the system 1900 happens to be showninstalled as individual components. However, some are all of them can becombined into an integrated box or component. For instance thecontroller 1910 (with or without battery) and the geo-positioningcircuit 1912 can be mounted inside a rugged electronics enclosure toprevent/hinder users from tampering with the same. That enclosure can bemounted and/or mechanically coupled to the vehicle 1902 inside anaccess-controlled volume such as the cargo compartment 1904 or cab 1906for further, or alternate protection from tampering, damage, and/or thelike. Indeed, it can be installed in the volume it is to monitor. Themounting can also be by way of special fasteners, welding, riveting,etc. so that attempts to open the enclosure would be readily apparentupon inspection or otherwise.

FIG. 20 illustrates another cargo anti-theft system. This system 2000happens to be installed on a trailer. FIG. 20 also illustrates variouscomponents of the system 2000 including a cargo compartment 2004, anaccess point 2008, a controller 2010, a geo-positioning circuit 2012, alock 2014, a switch halve 2018, and a camera 2022. Other sensors such astemperature, humidity, pressure, light, vibration, precipitation, etc.sensors could be included in the system to provide information regardingthe cargo and/or its environment. The cargo compartment 2004 is locatedin the bay of the trailer and the access point 2008 is the pair of doorsat one end of that trailer. These doors are usually configured such thatone overlaps the other making it necessary to open that door first andthen the other door. One door typically includes a manually lockablehandle and/or hardware to mount a separate lock in such a way as tosecure the doors. But, other types of doors and/or access points arewithin the scope of the current disclosure.

Moreover, the controller 2010 of the current embodiment is shown as aseparate component. But again, it could be integrated with othercomponents notably the geo-positioning circuit 1912 and/or the lock. Itis also shown mounted on a side wall of the trailer although it could bemounted on the floor, in a “mother's attic” (for moving vans), on theroof, underneath, etc. if desired. In the current embodiment, thegeo-positioning circuit 2012 is mounted on the roof of the trailer andis also secured to the trailer in a manner that would make attempts totamper with and/or remove it detectable as disclosed elsewhere herein.Its location also provides it with a relatively good vantage point atwhich it can send/receive signals to/from a telecommunications systemand/or a geo-positioning system. Its location also shields it fromcasual observation by those who might not be aware of the presence ofthe system 2000.

The lock 2014 of the current embodiment is a solenoid-bolt-operated lockalthough other types of locks are within the scope of the disclosure.For instance, a DC motor, stepper motor, or other actuation device coulddrive the lock. And, of course, it could be spring loaded or otherwisebiased into a default position such as the locked position. The lock2014 of the current embodiment could be provided with the system 2000although pre-existing locks could be wired into the system if desired.Moreover, it is shown as being mounted on the second-opening door of thetrailer and inside thereof although that need not be the case. Thisposition, though, would almost force an unauthorized user to somehowopen the first-opening door and then at least partially enter the cargocompartment 2004 before they could tamper with the lock 2014.Nonetheless the lock 2014 could include or be outfitted with a positionindicator or switch so that the controller 2010 could sense anunexpected (or otherwise) movement of the lock 2014 and/or its bolt.Should that event occur (for instance, the switch or other bolt statussensor indicates un-commanded movement), the controller 2010 could beconfigured to send a command to the lock 2014 to try to lock itself andcould send a signal to the geo-positioning circuit 2012 (and/or controlcenter) indicative of the event.

Systems of some embodiments rely on the manual lock ordinarily suppliedon the doors of most vehicles. The system includes a locking pinsufficiently strong that attempts to force the lock do not damage itenough that it would not be likely to release or break. In suchembodiments, the controller would operate the locking pin with the usersupplying the force to open the manual lock. Thus, instead of developingenough power to overcome the friction, inertia, etc. associated with themanual lock, the controller would produce enough power to operate therelatively smaller locking pin.

FIG. 20 also shows one half of a cargo switch or a switch halve 2018.Another switch halve of the current embodiment is located on the otherside of the truck and/or door although it is not visible in FIG. 20. Theswitch halves 2018 can be fashioned from and/or mechanically coupled toa sturdy cable such as one made of stranded metal or some other materialresistant to cutting, burning, snapping, and/or other forms ofdestructive activity that might somehow sever it. Of course the cablecould be replaced with or augmented with a sturdy bar, rod, etc. invarious embodiments. Moreover, the cables can be of a length sufficientto reach across the access point 2008 with minimal slack. The switchhalve 2018 can also include (or be connected to) a wire (or somewireless transmitter) so that the controller 2010 can sense the state ofthe switch (the two halves in combination). The switch sensing mechanismmay include: RFID sensors, infrared sensors, proximity sensors, Halleffect sensors, optical sensors, etc. Note that one switch halve 1218would be a male component and the other would be a female component inembodiments so that the two halves can be drawn together and mated.Since the switch halves are mechanically coupled to opposite sides ofthe access point 2008, doing so would necessarily involve closing thedoors and any opening of the doors (absent significant structural damagethereto) would necessarily involve disconnecting, de-mating, orotherwise separating the two switch halves 1218. That action could besensed by the controller 2010 thereby raising an alarm or at leastsending an appropriate signal to the geo-positioning circuit 2012 and/orcontrol center.

System 2000 of the current embodiment also includes the camera 2022 andcould include additional cameras. The camera can be positioned to viewthe access point 2008 and/or other locations at which users (includingauthorized and unauthorized) users and/or third parties might attemptaccess/entry into the cargo compartment 2004. Moreover, a camera 2022could be positioned on the outside of the trailer with a view of thesurrounding environment. Further still, a camera 2022 could bepositioned in the cab and/or with a view of the cargo. These cameras canbe mounted securely so that tampering with them would be evident as withother components of system 2000. These cameras 2022 can also beconfigured to communicate with the controller 2010 and/orgeo-positioning circuit 2012 by various means as disclosed elsewhereherein. They can also be configured to communicate with the controlcenter via a telecommunications network such as a cellular telephonysystem.

In some embodiments, the controller 2010 could be configured to generatea signal upon detection of an unusual event that would cause the cameras2022 to capture an image of the scene they view at the time of theevent. The cameras could also be configured to transmit those images tothe controller 2010, the geo-positioning circuit 2012, the controlcenter etc. And, if desired, those images can be time, date, and/orlocation stamped and can be associated with some sort of eventidentifier. In some systems the cameras are light activated so that anopening of the access point would be detected via ambient light thatmight illuminate the cargo area. In the current embodiment, therefore,when an event and/or incident occurs, contemporaneous images of theareas near the access point, the trailer, the cab, the cargo etc. can beobtained, preserved, stored, etc. for immediate and/or subsequentreview. In some instances, the cameras are activated upon signalrequested from the Geo positioning circuit and/or control center.Moreover, when the controller of the current embodiment detects a changeof state of the switch, it sends a signal to activate the camera(s).

Therefore, it seems likely that an image of the user, third party,perpetrator, and/or others who might be present would be obtained.Images of the state of the cargo at the time of the event might also beobtained in this way. Note that the cameras 2022 could even, or insteadbe activated on some (a) periodic schedule and even upon authorizedentries. In systems of such embodiments, the state of the cargo would beknown better than with heretofore available systems. Indeed, photos ofthe cargo can be obtained at the beginning of each (un)loading event andcompared to determine whether the appropriate amount of cargo was(un)loaded. Moreover, the appearance of unauthorized cargo, passengers,etc. could be identified and reported.

FIG. 21 illustrates an installed anti-theft controller. The controller2110 of the current embodiment is an integrated one with both controland geo-positioning capabilities resident therein and it happens to bemounted securely to a sturdy vehicle panel 212 that is rugged enough towithstand likely attempts to penetrate, damage, or destroy it. Moreover,the controller (or its enclosure) has a similarly sturdy flange 2114which defines a number of fastener holes. FIG. 21 shows severalfasteners 2116 and 2118 such as bolts and nuts securing the controller2110 to the vehicle panel 2112 by way of the flange 2114. Thesefasteners 21116 and 2118 can be of a type requiring specialized, rare,and/or customized tools to fasten and/or unfasten them. In that fashion(and/or other fashions) unauthorized parties without those tools wouldfind it difficult to remove the controller 2110 from the vehicle panel2112. Moreover, these fasteners 2116 and 2118 could be safety wired,coated, painted, etc. once installed to allow for ready detection ofattempts to unfasten them from the controller 2110 and/or vehicle panel2112. That detection would be by way of determining whether the safetywire was intact and/or the coating, paint, etc. is scratched. Thus, thecurrent embodiment provides a controller 2110 that if tampered withwould bear evidence of the same.

FIG. 22 schematically illustrates a cargo anti-theft system. The systemof the current embodiment includes a controller 2210, a geo-positioningcircuit 2212, a lock 2214, a cargo switch 2216, a battery 2220, ageozone input 2222, a cargo output 2224, and a cargo switch input 2226.FIG. 22 shows that the controller 2210 of the current embodimentcommunicates with the cargo switch 2216 and a pair of locks 2214. It ispowered by a separate battery 2220 as is the geo-positioning circuit2212. It also communicates with the geo-positioning circuit 2212 by wayof three signals: the geozone input 2222, the cargo output 2224, and thecargo switch input 2226. The geo-positioning circuit generates thegeozone output to indicate to the controller 2210 that the system 2200is (or is not) in an authorized geozone. The controller 2210 senses thestate of the cargo switch 2216 via the cargo switch input 2226 as doesthe geo-positioning circuit. Although, one or the other of these twodevices could sense it in embodiments. Moreover, FIG. 22 illustratesthat the controller 2210 generates the cargo output 2224 signal whichindicates that access is occurring (or has occurred) and which is sensedby the geo-positioning circuit 2212. Additionally, in the currentembodiment, the controller generates a common lock control signal 2228which it uses to control the locks 2214 although separately activatedlocks could be provided in embodiments.

With further reference to FIG. 22, note that many geo-positioningcircuits include onboard batteries. These batteries can be selected suchthat they supply a longer operating period then the battery 2220(whether internal to the controller 2210 or external). In this manner,the geo-positioning circuit can continue to operate even after thebattery 2220 discharges and renders the controller 2210 inoperable. Whensuch events occur, the geo-positioning circuit 2212 can continuereporting the geo location of the system 2200 and any data that it mightbe able to obtain from, for instance, the cargo switch input 2226 and/orvarious cameras.

FIG. 23 schematically illustrates another cargo anti-theft system. Inthe current embodiment, the control unit 2300 includes both fuel andcargo protection-related circuits. More specifically, the control unit2300 includes and/or communicates with a cargo switch 2304, a resistor2306, a lock solenoid 2308, a lock switch 2312, and a battery 2316. Thecargo switch is illustrated as a pair of normally open contacts althoughit can be made from two switch halves as disclosed elsewhere herein.Note that the control unit 2300 senses the cargo switch 2304 through thevoltage dividing variable resistor 2306 such that the voltage sensed atthe control unit 2300 can be set by the user. In the current embodiment,the value of the resistor 2306 can be programmed via the control unit2300 over a telecommunications system (for instance, by a user in thecontrol center). Accordingly, the control unit 2300 can be configured togenerate a cargo switch-related signal if the voltage it senses at itsinput is incorrect (and/or off by more than some pre-determined amount).Thus, if a third party attempts to mimic the presence of a closed cargoswitch at that input of the control unit 2300 with a voltage supply, thecontrol unit 2300 is likely to detect an anomalous event and raise acorresponding signal.

Note also that the control unit 2300 senses the position of the lock vialock switch 2312. While lock switch 2312 is indicated as a switch, anytype of position sensor could be used for that component. For instance,a linear resistor position indicator could be used. The control unit2300 of the current embodiment also drives the lock solenoid 2308. Thus,it can control the (commanded) position of one or more locks. Thecontrol unit 2300 also includes an onboard battery 2316. Thus, it canoperate independently of a vehicle power supply at least for some time.And, for outside mounted components, a solar panel could be provided topower such components and/or the system.

FIG. 24 illustrates a cargo switch and a pair of cab to trailerconnectors. The switch halves 2402 and 2404 (of the cable switch 2400)are shown mechanically coupled to a corresponding pair of cables 2406and wires 2408. One switch half 2402 is male while the other is femalein the current embodiment. FIG. 24 also illustrates a pair of cab totrailer switch halves 2410 and 2412 one of which is male and the otherof which is female. These switch halves 2410 and 2412 can be used toconnect trailer-located components of various embodiments to cab-locatedcomponents.

With reference again to FIG. 12, note that method 1200 can includemonitoring the cargo anti-theft controllers, geo-positioning circuits,cargo switches, lock switches, cameras, systems, etc. disclosed herein.Thus, embodiments provide cargo anti-theft systems, sensors,controllers, etc. which allow for the monitoring of vehicle cargocompartment for potential tampering and/or cargo theft. Some suchsystems allow for discreet, unobtrusive, and potentially unsuspectedcargo monitoring. In some embodiments, the sensors, controllers,systems, etc. are reliable, rugged, and relatively inexpensive toinstall and/or operate. Systems of some embodiments allow users toinvestigate potential cargo-theft events remotely and to implementcorrective actions.

CONCLUSION

Although the subject matter has been disclosed in language specific tostructural features and/or methodological acts, it is to be understoodthat the subject matter defined in the appended claims is notnecessarily limited to the specific features or acts disclosed above.Rather, the specific features and acts described herein are disclosed asillustrative implementations of the claims.

What is claimed is:
 1. A cargo anti-theft protection controllercomprising: a cargo switch input configured to sense a ground of a cargovehicle through a cargo switch; an output configured to be incommunication with an electronically operated lock; and a circuit incommunication with the input and the output and being configured todetect an opening of the cargo switch via a pre-selected voltage at thecargo switch input and, responsive thereto, to activate the lock via theoutput; wherein the cargo switch to be mechanically coupled to a cargoaccess point on the cargo vehicle in such a manner that the cargo accesspoint cannot be opened without opening the cargo switch.
 2. Thecontroller of claim 1 further comprising a geo-positioning output incommunication with the circuit, the circuit being further configured tooutput a signal indicative of the opening of the cargo switch via thegeo-positioning output.
 3. The controller of claim 1 further comprisinga geo-zone input and being further configured to output a signal via theoutput to unlock the lock only in pre-selected geo-zones.
 4. Thecontroller of claim 1 wherein the pre-selected voltage differs from 12VDC.
 5. The controller of claim 1 further comprising a user inputconfigured to accept a user-selected voltage, the controller beingfurther configured to change the pre-selected voltage to theuser-selected voltage.
 6. The controller of claim 1 wherein thecontroller is further configured to sense a PIN (personal identificationnumber) associated with openings and closings of the cargo switch. 7.The controller of claim 1 further comprising a mechanical couplerconfigured to securely couple the controller to the cargo vehicle. 8.The controller of claim 1 further comprising a lock position input andwherein the controller is further configured to sense a position of thelock via the lock position input and to sense whether the lock positioninput is electronically open.
 9. The controller of claim 8 furtherwherein the controller is further configured to output a signalindicative that the lock should lock responsive to the position of thelock.
 10. The controller of claim 1 further comprising a batteryconfigured to power the controller.
 11. The controller of claim 1wherein the controller is further configured to change a PIN (PersonalIdentification Number) associated with openings and closings of thecargo switch.
 12. An anti-theft protection system comprising: acontroller further comprising, a cargo switch input configured to sensea ground of a cargo vehicle through a cargo switch; an output configuredto be in communication with an electronically operated lock; and acircuit in communication with the input and the output and beingconfigured to detect an opening of the cargo switch via a pre-selectedvoltage at the cargo switch input and, responsive thereto, to activatethe lock via the output; a cargo switch in electrical communication withthe cargo switch input; an electronically operated lock in communicationwith the output; and a mechanical coupling wherein the cargo switch ismechanically coupled to a cargo access point on the cargo vehicle insuch a manner that the cargo access point cannot be opened withoutopening the cargo switch.
 13. The system of claim 1 further comprising ageo-positioning output in communication with the circuit, the circuitbeing further configured to output a signal indicative of the opening ofthe cargo switch via the geo-positioning output.
 14. The system of claim1 further comprising a geo-zone input and being further configured tooutput a signal via the output to unlock the lock only in pre-selectedgeo-zones.
 15. The system of claim 1 wherein the pre-selected voltagediffers from 12 VDC.
 16. The system of claim 1 further comprising a userinput configured to accept a user-selected voltage, the controller beingfurther configured to change the pre-selected voltage to theuser-selected voltage.
 17. The system of claim 1 wherein the controlleris further configured to sense a PIN (personal identification number)associated with openings and closings of the cargo switch.
 18. Thesystem of claim 1 further comprising a mechanical coupler configured tosecurely couple the controller to the cargo vehicle.
 19. The system ofclaim 1 further comprising a lock position input and wherein thecontroller is further configured to sense a position of the lock via thelock position input.
 20. A method of protecting cargo comprising:sensing a ground of a cargo vehicle through a cargo switch; using acircuit in communication with the cargo switch to detect the opening ofthe cargo switch via a pre-selected voltage; responsive thereto, andusing the circuit, activating a lock positioned at a cargo access pointon the cargo vehicle; wherein the cargo switch is mechanically coupledto the cargo access point in such a manner that the cargo access pointcannot be opened without opening the cargo switch; outputting a signalindicative of the opening of the cargo switch to a geo-positioningcircuit in communication with the circuit; sensing a PIN (personalidentification number) associated with openings and closings of thecargo switch.